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The framing of interventions as ‘saving strangers’, or as responses to a shared 
responsibility to protect populations from mass atrocities, has become dominant, 
especially with ‘the expansion of liberal interventionism throughout the 1990s’.1 
Many important dimensions of the contemporary intervention landscape have 
been explored in debates about liberal interventionism’s response to crisis, and 
the optimistic views of the 1990s have been challenged. With reference to how 
‘Iraq and Afghanistan have created a crisis of both confidence and credibility for 
proponents of intervention’, liberal interventionism is (again) said to be in crisis.2 
One central theme in current debates about the ‘crisis’ of liberal interventionism 
is a disagreement over the nature of this crisis. In response to what he refers to 
as a ‘hyper-critical’ school of scholars, Roland Paris sets out to save liberal inter-
ventionism not from its crisis but from its critics.3 To him, the question becomes 
whether the focus should be on ‘explor[ing] alternatives within liberal peace-
building’ or alternatives that go beyond liberal interventionism.4 These disagree-
ments are reflected in different answers to the question of whether the current 
crisis in liberal interventionism is best offset by pragmatic, incremental improve-
ments, or whether more radical changes are needed.5 Another central theme is 
the question of how to interpret liberal interventionism’s response to this crisis 
* This article is part of a special section titled Peacebuilding in an era of pragmatism. We are grateful to Louise Wiuff 
Moe and Finn Stepputat as special section editors, as well as to Roland Paris, Markus-Michael Müller, three 
anonymous reviewers and the editors of International Affairs for comments on earlier versions. This article also 
benefited from discussions at the ISA Annual Convention in Baltimore, 25 February 2017, at the EISA confe-
rence in Barcelona, 14 September 2017, and at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, 
7 June 2017.
1 Nicholas Wheeler, Saving strangers: humanitarian intervention in international society (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2000); Edward C. Luck, ‘Sovereignty, choice, and the Responsibility to Protect’, Global Responsibil-
ity to Protect 1: 1, 2009, pp. 10–21; Philippa Atkinson, ‘Liberal interventionism in Liberia: towards a tentatively 
just approach? Analysis’, Conflict, Security and Development 8: 1, 2008, pp. 15–45.
2 Neil Cooper, ‘Review article: on the crisis of the liberal peace’, Conflict, Security and Development 7: 4, 2007, 
pp. 605–16. See also Stanley Hoffmann, ‘The crisis of liberal internationalism’, Foreign Policy, no. 98 (Spring 
1995), pp. 159–77; Georg Sørensen, A liberal world order in crisis: choosing between imposition and restraint (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2011). 
3 Roland Paris, ‘Saving liberal peacebuilding’, Review of International Studies 36: 1, 2010, p. 338.
4 Paris, ‘Saving liberal peacebuilding’, p. 339 (emphasis in original); Neil Cooper, Mandy Turner and Michael 
Pugh, ‘The end of history and the last liberal peacebuilder: a reply to Roland Paris’, Review of International 
Studies 37: 4, 2011, pp. 1995–2006.
5 Roland Paris, ‘Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism’, International Security 22: 2, Autumn 
1997, pp. 54–89.
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of confidence and credibility. While some scholars suggest that we are seeing the 
return of proxy interventions,6 or that we are witnessing an ‘impasse’, as liberal 
interveners ‘are increasingly unable to purposefully and instrumentally engage 
with international governance problems’,7 others argue that the crisis has sparked 
a retreat from liberal interventionism. Neil Cooper, for example, suggests that 
we are seeing a ‘retreat from democracy in liberal interventionism’,8 while David 
Chandler describes what he see as ‘a retreat from the consequences of this liberal 
internationalist imaginary’,9 and Mark Duffield argues that this retreat—in his 
analysis, a retreat of international aid workers into fortified compounds—is not 
antithetical to a form of interventionism that at the same time appears ‘expansive’.10
The present article adds to these debates, developing the idea that what may 
appear as a retreat is not necessarily antithetical to expansion. We do so by 
showing why attention should be given to one important, yet under-theorized, 
form of intervention—conflict prevention—when interpreting liberal interven-
tionism’s response to its double crisis. Key institutions of liberal intervention, 
notably the UN, are placing renewed emphasis on conflict prevention, and have 
made monitoring and other forms of knowledge production central elements 
of preventive diplomacy.11 In this article, we analyse what this renewed focus 
on conflict prevention says about the crisis in liberal interventionism. We argue 
that while conflict prevention is sometimes presented as a pragmatic retreat from 
‘intervening’, it is better understood as a different mode of intervention.
Importantly, focusing on conflict prevention allows us to demonstrate how, 
although ‘policy debates have shifted away from intrusive forms of coercive inter-
national governance’, this trend is not necessarily indicative of retreat or disengage-
ment.12 Indeed, we offer an alternative reading of prevention as an interventionary 
practice which is inseparable from power/knowledge effects unintended by inter-
veners.13 Once conflict prevention is recognized as a practice of intervention, the 
6 See e.g. Florian P. Kühn and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, ‘Letter from the editors: revisiting ten years of interven-
tion and statebuilding’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 10: 1, 2016, pp. 1–2. 
7 Peter Finkenbusch, ‘“Post-liberal” peacebuilding and the crisis of international authority’, Peacebuilding 4: 3, 
2016, p. 248. 
8 Cooper, ‘Review article: on the crisis of the liberal peace’. 
9 David Chandler, ‘Resilience and human security: the post-interventionist paradigm’, Security Dialogue 43: 3, 
2012, pp. 213–29 at p. 18. On ‘retreat’, see also Colleen Bell and Brad Evans, ‘Post-interventionary societies: 
an introduction’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 4: 4, 2010, pp. 363–70; Robin Niblett, ‘Liberalism in 
retreat: the demise of a dream’, Foreign Affairs 96: 1, January/February 2017, pp. 17–24.
10 Mark Duffield, ‘The liberal way of development and the development–security impasse: exploring the global 
life-chance divide’, Security Dialogue 41: 1, 2010, pp. 53–76. See also Michael Aaronson, Ariel I. Ahram, Mark 
Duffield, Amitai Etzioni, Jack Holland, Roger Mac Ginty, Laura McLeod, Sukanya Podder, Oliver P. Rich-
mond and David Roberts, ‘The Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding ten years on: critical reflections and 
stimulating ideas on an evolving scholarship’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 10: 1, 2016, pp. 3–24.
11 Adrian Gallagher, ‘The promise of pillar II: analysing international assistance under the Responsibility 
to Protect’, International Affairs 91: 6, Nov. 2015, pp. 1259–76; Alex J. Bellamy and Christopher T. Hunt, 
‘Twenty-first century peace operations: protection, force and the changing security environment’, Interna-
tional Affairs 91: 6, Nov. 2015, pp. 1277–98.
12 David Chandler, ‘Rethinking the conflict–poverty nexus: from securitising intervention to resilience’, Stabil-
ity: International Journal of Security and Development 4: 1, 2015, pp. 1–14 at p. 2. 
13 Gëzim Visoka, ‘Peace is what we make of it?’, Peacebuilding 4: 1, 2016, pp. 54–70. This is true not only for 
‘liberal peace actions’ undertaken by the UN. See e.g. Berit Bliesemann de Guevara’s analysis of knowledge 
production and notions of ‘authenticity’ in German policy-making vis-à-vis conflict spaces in ‘Intervention 
theatre: performance, authenticity and expert knowledge in politicians’ travel to post-/conflict spaces’, Journal 
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recent return to (and renewed attempts at) this approach can then be understood 
as part of a broader trend wherein liberal interventionism is finding new forms of 
engagement, including ‘light footprint’, technology-enabled forms of interven-
tion with fewer ‘boots on the ground’, and/or ‘earlier’ forms of intervention.14 We 
argue that the knowledge production inherent in contemporary conflict preven-
tions is interventionary in and of itself. It not only paves the way for future inter-
ventions, but produces changes in conflict dynamics on the ground.
The overarching research question that we address in this article is as follows: 
how does understanding knowledge production for conflict prevention as an 
interventionary practice offer new analytical perspectives on the 2015 crisis in 
Burundi? To explore this question, the article proceeds as follows. First we situate 
the turn to prevention in the context of broader reforms of UN peace opera-
tions, with prevention becoming a continuous undertaking aimed at ‘sustaining’ 
rather than ‘building’ a (liberal) peace. Next, we situate our conceptualization of 
prevention as intervention in relation to current calls for a broader understanding 
of what should be considered an interventionary practice. We go on to argue that 
Michel Foucault’s notions of power/knowledge and resistance are useful analytical 
lenses through which to show that liberal interventionism’s preventive endeavours 
are interventionary. The significance of conceptualizing preventive knowledge 
production as interventionary is then demonstrated in an analysis, based on inter-
views in Bujumbura and New York, of the UN’s preventive endeavours in relation 
to the political crisis in Burundi in 2015–2016.15
A pragmatic (re)turn to conflict prevention
Humanitarian interventions in which international forces took it upon themselves 
to ‘save strangers’ were arguably the most visible aspect of the 1990s surge in inter-
ventionism. Yet, in response to the failures of the UN in Rwanda and elsewhere, 
the 1990s also witnessed debates about conflict prevention. Conflict prevention 
is not a new ambition in the UN system.16 Recognition of the importance of 
preventive diplomacy, as part of broader conflict prevention efforts, dates back to 
the days of Dag Hammarskjöld in the 1950s.17 More recently, the Brahimi Report 
of Intervention and Statebuilding 11: 1, 2017, pp. 58–80. 
14 Duffield, ‘The liberal way of development’; Louise Wiuff Moe and Markus-Michael Müller, eds, Reconfiguring 
intervention: complexity, resilience and the ‘local turn’ in counterinsurgent warfare (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2017).
15 We wish to make it clear to the reader that this assessment should not be seen as a moral judgement by the 
authors. In our view, interventions can be necessary under certain circumstances. We do not take a stance on 
whether those circumstances are present in the case of Burundi or not. Rather, we wish to show the analytical 
value of understanding conflict prevention as an interventionary practice.
16 Despite the desirability of conflict prevention, it is an agenda which has proved difficult to implement—and 
which has arguably ‘remained peripheral to the study of peace operations’. See Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. 
Williams, Peace operations and global order (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), p. 12; also Eli Stamnes, ‘Critical security 
studies and the United Nations preventive deployment in Macedonia’, International Peacekeeping 11: 1, 2004, pp. 
161–81.
17 UN Secretary-General, Preventive diplomacy: delivering results, 26 Aug. 2001, http://www.un.org/undpa/sites/
www.un.org.undpa/files/SG%20Report%20on%20Preventive%20Diplomacy.pdf. (Unless otherwise noted at 
point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 29 Oct. 2017.)
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of 2000 mentioned fact-finding missions and monitoring as being at the very heart 
of preventive efforts, while at the same time noticing ‘the understandable and 
legitimate concern of Member States, especially the small and weak among them, 
about sovereignty’.18 As conflict prevention has returned to the agenda, the case 
of Burundi illustrates how monitoring has taken priority over concern for the 
sovereignty of this small state. Micah Zenko and Rebecca Friedman have made a 
related argument about UN early warning systems. Writing in 2011, they found a 
‘general aversion of member states to being monitored by any outside organiza-
tion for activities that occur within their sovereign territory’.19 
The 2015 reports by the High-level Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) and the 
Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) Advisory Group of Experts laid the analytical 
ground for a renewed focus on conflict prevention, especially by introducing to 
the UN system the concept of sustaining peace, which makes peacebuilding a 
continuous enterprise and therefore necessitates constant knowledge produc-
tion.20 Indeed, a key element of the contemporary re-emergence of conflict 
prevention is its focus on the need for central actors, notably the UN Security 
Council (UNSC), to be informed about developments on the ground much earlier 
and more extensively than has hitherto been the case. Since taking office on 1 
January 2017, the new Secretary-General, António Guterres, has made preven-
tion his main platform; for example, in his first address to the UNSC in his new 
capacity, he said: ‘We must rebalance our approach to peace and security. For 
decades, this has been dominated by responding to conflict. For the future, we 
need to do far more to prevent war and sustain peace.’21
This renewed focus on prevention is often justified with reference to the prefer-
ability of preventing conflict over managing conflict. Arguments in favour of 
preventing conflicts revolve around the lower human and economic costs incurred 
where the need for forceful intervention is avoided. It is commonly accepted that 
‘many—both within the UN and outside of it—believe that an increased focus 
on conflict prevention would be far cheaper than a continued narrow focus on 
ongoing or recurring conflicts’.22 The Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, as 
President of the UNSC, exemplified this belief in her statement of 10 January 
2017, in which she coupled the UN’s resource constraints with the urgency of 
improving conflict prevention: 
18 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, S/2000/809 (the Brahimi Report) (New York: UN, 2000), 
p. 5.
19 Micah Zenko and Rebecca R. Friedman, ‘UN early warning for preventing conflict’, International Peacekeeping 
18: 1, 2011, pp. 29–30.
20 Uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people, report of the UN High-level Independent Panel on UN 
Peace Operations, S/2015/446 (New York: UN, 2015; hereafter HIPPO Report); Advisory Group of Experts on 
the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture, Challenge of sustaining peace, S/2015/490 (New York: UN, 2015).
21 Secretary-General’s remarks to the Security Council open debate on ‘Maintenance of international peace and 
security: conflict prevention and sustaining peace’ (as delivered), 10 Jan. 2017, https://www.un.org/sg/en/
content/sg/statement/2017-01-10/secretary-generals-remarks-security-council-open-debate-maintenance; 
Thomas G. Weiss and Tatiana Carayannis, ‘Windows of opportunity for UN reform: historical insights for 
the next Secretary-General’, International Affairs 93: 2, March 2017, pp. 309–26.
22 Gustavo de Carvalho and Adriana Erthal Abdenur, Getting clear about conflict prevention at the UN (Pretoria, 
Addis Ababa, Dakar and Nairobi: Institute for Security Studies, 7 July 2016), https://issafrica.org/iss-today/
getting-clear-about-conflict-prevention-at-the-un.
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The United Nations humanitarian and peacekeeping instruments have come under 
immense pressure, with $22.2 billion in humanitarian appeals and over 100,000 United 
Nations peacekeepers. Meanwhile, research shows that measures to peacefully prevent 
conflict cost, on average, just a tenth of post-conflict recovery efforts. Investing in preven-
tion is not only morally right; it is the smart, economically sound and sustainable thing 
to do.23 
The hope is that, by preventing conflict, the need to deploy UN peacekeepers 
can be reduced, which would mean less intervention and fewer expenses. This 
viewpoint is echoed by research. Malcolm Chambers, for example, has calculated 
that, ‘even on conservative assumptions, investments in conflict prevention can be 
highly cost-effective for the international community’.24
One result of the distinction between preventing and managing conflict is that 
conflict prevention is seen as separate from intervention. Instead of analysing the 
power effects of conflict prevention, the focus tends to be on its technical aspects. 
Alice Ackermann, for example, surveys the literature and finds that while much 
attention is given to the ‘viability, legality, and effectiveness of conflict prevention’, 
its political effects are never questioned, and so it is not seen as interventionary.25 
In contrast to this prevailing perspective, we argue that preventive endeavours 
have a number of important effects that are de facto interventionary. On the basis 
of this argument, we offer an alternative perspective on the UN’s conflict preven-
tion endeavours by showing how the knowledge production inherent in contem-
porary preventive diplomacy has become an element in intense struggles over 
claims to define the ‘true’ account of the contested situation in Burundi. 
Analytical framework: interventionary practices and power/knowledge 
Traditionally, and especially in the liberal peace tradition, intervention means 
forceful intervention. Michael Doyle, for example, contrasts this with non-forceful 
intervention, which he refers to as ‘interference’.26 Unfortunately, the issue of 
conflict prevention has been ‘masked by’ the much stronger focus on ‘forceful 
interventions’.27 Nonetheless, some scholars have argued that to understand the 
contemporary landscape of intervention, we need to look not only at practices 
that qualify as forceful interventions, but at interventionist practices more 
broadly conceived, including capacity-building missions, crisis management and 
23 Margot Wallström, ‘Remarks by Minister for Foreign Affairs Margot Wallström at ministerial debate in the 
Security Council on conflict prevention and sustaining peace’, Government of Sweden, 10 Jan. 2017, http://
www.government.se/speeches/2017/01/remarks-by-minister-for-foreign-affairs-margot-wallstrom-at- 
ministerial-debate-in-the-security-council-om-conflict-prevention-and-sustaining-peace/. 
24 Malcolm Chambers, ‘Spending to save? The cost-effectiveness of conflict prevention’, Defence and Peace 
Economics 18: 1, 2007, pp. 1–23 at p. 20.
25 Alice Ackermann, ‘The idea and practice of conflict prevention’, Journal of Peace Research 40: 3, 2003, pp. 339–47.
26 Discussing intervention through the lens of an essay on the topic by John Stuart Mill, Doyle finds that sover-
eignty is the norm, but that it is sometimes justified to override or disregard sovereignty in favour of interven-
tion for the purpose of protection. See Michael W. Doyle, The question of intervention: John Stuart Mill and the 
Responsibility to Protect (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015).
27 Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite, ‘Power/knowledge in international peacebuilding: the case of the 
EU police mission in Bosnia’, Alternatives 30: 3, 2005, pp. 297–323.
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‘neo liberal reforms’.28 These scholars have called for a broader understanding of 
what practices are conceived of as interventionary. They have debated what this 
broader set of interventionary practices tells us about how power operates in the 
context of contemporary interventionism—and not only when intervention takes 
the form of forceful, military operations.29 This literature frames our analysis of 
the UN’s preventive activities in Burundi in 2015 and 2016 as an interventionary 
practice. Like the scholars cited above, we broaden the notion of intervention. We 
argue that it should include elements of contemporary conflict prevention, with a 
specific focus on preventive knowledge production.30 
To frame our analysis of the preventive endeavours of the UN as interven-
tionary, we draw on Foucault’s concept of power/knowledge and the idea that 
‘there is no point in dreaming of a time when knowledge will cease to depend 
on power … It is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is 
impossible for knowledge not to engender power.’31 
In drawing upon this aspect of Foucault’s work, we engage with and build on an 
important post-structuralist legacy as well as emerging debates about know ledge 
production in intervention.32 Concerning the former, early post-structuralists 
demonstrated how Foucauldian insights could help expand our appreciation of 
the effects of practices of intervention: for example, by calling attention to the role 
of representational practices in shaping possibilities for intervention in the case of 
Bosnia,33 and to knowledge as ‘a constitutive part of the world of meaning and 
practice’,34 rather than as something neutral and unprejudiced, distinct from the 
exercise of power. While these insights form a crucial backdrop for the analysis 
offered in this article, we also seek to extend them by suggesting that conflict 
prevention and related knowledge production are themselves to be understood 
28 Julien Jeandesboz, ‘Intervention and subversion: the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine’, 
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 9: 4, 2015, pp. 442–70; Katja Lindskov Jacobsen, ‘Maritime security and 
capacity building in the Gulf of Guinea: on comprehensiveness, gaps, and security priorities’, African Security 
Review 26: 3, 2017, pp. 237–56; Ruben Andersson and Florian Weigand, ‘Intervention at risk: the vicious cycle 
of distance and danger in Mali and Afghanistan’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 9: 4, 2015, pp. 491–541; 
Graham Harrison, ‘Practices of intervention: repertoires, habits, and conduct in neoliberal Africa’, Journal of 
Intervention and Statebuilding 4: 4, 2010, pp. 433–52.
29 Marc G. Doucet, ‘Global assemblages of security governance and contemporary international intervention’, 
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 10: 1, 2016, pp. 116–32; Christian Olsson, ‘Interventionism as practice: on 
“ordinary transgressions” and their routinization’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 9: 4, 2015, pp. 425–41; 
Harrison, ‘Practices of intervention’; Mark Duffield, Development, security and unending war: governing the world 
of peoples (Cambridge: Polity, 2007); Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, ‘Introduction: the privati-
sation and globalisation of security in Africa’, International Relations 21: 2, 2007, pp. 131–41; Jan Bachmann, 
Colleen Bell and Caroline Holmqvist, eds, War, police and assemblages of intervention (New York: Routledge, 
2015); Aaronson et al., ‘The Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding ten years on’. 
30 Accordingly, we do not attempt to set definitional boundaries for intervention.
31 Michel Foucault, Power/knowledge: selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977 (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 
p. 52.
32 See e.g. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 11: 1, 2017, special issue on ‘Knowledge production in conflict 
and intervention: finding “facts”, telling “truth”’.
33 David Campbell, National deconstruction: violence, identity, and justice in Bosnia (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1998); Lene Hansen, Security as practice: discourse analysis and the Bosnian War (London: Rout-
ledge, 2006).
34 Vivienne Jabri, Discourses on violence: conflict analysis reconsidered (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 
p. 23; see also Cynthia Weber, Simulating sovereignty; intervention, the state and symbolic exchange (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995).
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as interventionary—that is, not as important only because of how they shape 
 possibilities for future—or rather further—intervention. From this starting-point, 
our analysis demonstrates how the UN’s preventive endeavours, notably the 
knowledge produced and made available to external actors, can be said to ‘engender 
power’, and to affect conflict dynamics and patterns of violence in ways that one 
cannot see if prevention is conceptualized as something that precedes intervention.
In using power/knowledge to frame our analysis of UN practices of conflict 
prevention, we also build on a more recent body of literature that draws upon—
or examines the limits of35—Foucault’s notion of power/knowledge. Examples 
include work by Merlingen and Ostrauskaite,36 who have used a power/knowledge 
approach to examine critically various EU peacebuilding activities; Solà-Martín,37 
who has used the notion to examine the UN’s conflict resolution endeavours in 
the Western Sahara; and Barry Ryan,38 who has operationalized the notion to 
unpack an otherwise overlooked effect of international actors’ involvement in 
police reform, namely how ‘police reform is situated at the confluence of the 
production of power/knowledge and the assumptions of liberal peace’.39 Grayson, 
too, has applied Foucault’s notion of power/knowledge in his analysis of ‘biopo-
litical intervention’.40 Collectively, these analyses have delivered valuable insights 
about, for example, power effects of seemingly neutral knowledge production. 
Even so, the question of power/knowledge effects in the context of the UN’s 
efforts at conflict prevention remains under-theorized. 
The UN’s renewed emphasis on conflict prevention represents a ripe moment 
for extending our power/knowledge analysis to the realm of monitoring and other 
forms of preventive knowledge production. When, for preventive purposes, the 
UN expands its monitoring activities and increasingly produces knowledge to be 
made available to external actors, this should be expected to entail various power 
effects. To study these in the case of knowledge production for the purpose of 
conflict prevention in Burundi, we also draw upon Foucault’s notion of resistance. 
For Foucault, resistance is integral to the exercise of power: ‘There are no relations 
of power without resistances; the latter are all the more real and effective because 
they are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised.’41 What 
this means for our analysis is that we pay careful attention to how the Govern-
ment of Burundi (GoB), in various ways, resists the UN’s preventive endeavours 
(monitoring, reporting and other forms of knowledge production) through a 
number of counter-strategies. Within this framing, the GoB’s refusal to accept the 
preventive presence of the UN becomes an important indicator of resistance to 
35 Part of this revival of Foucauldian analysis is also a debate about the limits of key terms such as power/
knowledge and discourse (see David Lewis, ‘The myopic Foucauldian gaze: discourse, knowledge and the 
authoritarian peace’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 11: 1, 2017, pp. 21–41).
36 Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, ‘Power/knowledge in international peacebuilding’.
37 Andreu Solà-Martín, ‘Lessons from MINURSO: a contribution to new thinking’, International Peacekeeping 13: 
3, 2006, pp. 366–80.
38 Barry Ryan, Statebuilding and police reform: the freedom of security (London: Routledge, 2011). 
39 Ryan, Statebuilding, p. 52.
40 Kyle Grayson, ‘Human security as power/knowledge: the biopolitics of a definitional debate’, Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs 21: 3, 2008, pp. 383–401.
41 Foucault, Power/knowledge, p. 142.
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the UN’s exercise of power. This analysis challenges the representation of preven-
tive monitoring and reporting as neutral and objective practices—even if they are 
understood as such by those who implement them. 
Conflict prevention: the case of Burundi
Our analysis of how power/knowledge effects played out in the context of the 
international community’s conflict prevention efforts in relation to the situa-
tion in Burundi in 2015–2016 is based on interviews as well as analysis of official 
documents and news sources. We conducted interviews in Bujumbura in July 2016 
and in New York during the autumn of that year. In Bujumbura, we interviewed 
Burundian government officials, including politicians and senior civil servants, 
whose statements form the basis of our analysis of the actions and positions of 
the GoB. We did not conduct interviews with opposition figures, relying instead 
on their public statements, both for security reasons and because the analysis is 
mainly about the relation between the GoB and the international community. 
Also in Bujumbura we interviewed independent Burundian academics, who 
were immensely helpful in offering perspectives on historical and institutional 
dynamics. In both Bujumbura and New York, we interviewed UN staff members 
and foreign diplomats covering Burundi about their roles and positions.42 All 
statements from the interviews are treated either as the views of interested parties 
or as a prompt to triangulate information with other sources. The additional 
sources consist mainly of official documents that express the decisions and stand-
points of the parties, supplemented with news sources when necessary.43
The international community has been involved in developments and crises 
in Burundi for decades.44 The analysis presented below is, however, limited to a 
discussion of selected events that occurred between the spring of 2015 and early 
2017, when Burundi became the focus of an intensive campaign of preventive 
diplomacy by the international community, notably the UN.45
On 25 April 2015, the ruling party in Burundi announced that the sitting 
 President, Pierre Nkurunziza, would stand in the forthcoming elections sched-
uled for 26 June 2015. This was controversial, because the constitution limits 
presidential tenure to two terms of five years, and Nkurunziza had been president 
for ten years; the opposition accordingly warned that his renewed candidature 
42 Because the situation in Burundi was still precarious at the time of writing, we have accepted the interviewees’ 
wish to remain anonymous.
43 It should be stressed that although we focus on the role of the UN, we do not wish to suggest a homogeneous 
idea of ‘interveners’. Indeed, in the case of Burundi in 2015–16, the AU, the EAC, individual states and others 
also played important roles. Had this preventive endeavour been a response to a precarious situation in a differ-
ent country, the configuration of intervening actors would probably have taken a different form. 
44 For more historical background, see e.g. Walter Lotze and Alexandra Martins, ‘The responsibility to prevent 
atrocity crimes’, in Serena K. Sharma and Jennifer M. Welsh, eds, The responsibility to prevent: overcoming the 
challenges of atrocity prevention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 250–79. See also René Lemarchand, 
Burundi: ethnic conflict and genocide (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
45 Since the situation on the ground has not been settled at the time of writing, we do not attempt to evaluate 
the events or make predictions about their outcome(s).
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was unconstitutional and could send Burundi into chaos.46 In turn, Nkurunziza 
argued that because the parliament had appointed him for the first five years, that 
period of his presidency should not be included in the constitutionally defined 
two-term limit. On 5 May 2015, the Constitutional Court ruled in favour of 
the President,47 albeit amid considerable controversy (the vice-president of the 
court fled the country).48 In the lead-up to the presidential election, demon-
strations intensified. Security forces responded with force, and accusations of 
responsibility for the violence went back and forth.49 On 13 May, while Nkurun-
ziza was in Tanzania for an East African Community summit about the crisis 
in Burundi, the protests against the President culminated in an attempted coup 
d’état. This was quickly defeated by government forces, and the following day 
 Nkurunziza returned to Burundi to declare victory.50 Following pressure from 
the  opposition and the  international community, the elections were postponed 
to 21 July 2015. The opposition boycotted the poll, but the electoral commission 
kept their names on the ballots, as they had already announced their candida-
tures. Nkurunziza won with 69.41 per cent of the votes.51 At this point, the 
violence began to take on the form of an armed insurrection. Grenade attacks, 
including on civilian targets and police forces, created an atmosphere of uncer-
tainty and fear. On 11 December 2015, the violence reached a peak with attacks 
on army barracks.52 The government crackdown that followed reportedly left 
34 people dead in the streets of Bujumbura, in addition to those killed in the 
attacks.53 In 2016, overt general violence diminished once more, but targeted 
assassinations of political figures began to become a dominant motif.54 By the 
end of the year, the situation was seemingly stable, but remained very tense. 
More than 300,000 refugees remained outside the country and, as we will show 
below, disagreements over both how to define the situation and how to respond 
to it ran deep.55
46 BBC Afrique, ‘Le CNDD-FDD investit Nkurunziza’, 25 April 2015, http://www.bbc.com/afrique/region/ 
2015/04/150425_burundi-politics. 
47 Cour Constitutionelle de Burundi, ‘RCCB 303’, 5 May 2015.
48 BBC News, ‘Burundi court backs President Nkurunziza on third-term’, 5 May 2015, http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-africa-32588658. 
49 See e.g. ‘Burundi: nouvelles attaques à la grenade à une semaine des élections’, Africantime.com, 23 June 2015, 
http://fr.africatime.com/burundi/db/burundi-nouvelles-attaques-la-grenade-une-semaine-des-elections. 
50 Goran Tomasevic, ‘Burundi’s president urges end to protest, coup leader at large’, Reuters, 15 May 2015, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-politics-idUSKBN0NY0O020150515. 
51 Commission Electorale Nationale Independante, ‘Préesentation des résultats provisoires de l’election prési-
dentielle 2015’, 31 July 2015, http://www.ceniburundi.bi/presentation-des-resultats-provisoires-de-l- election-
presidentielle-2015. 
52 BBC News, ‘Burundi crisis: military bases attacked in Bujumbura’, 11 Dec. 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-africa-35070154. 
53 According the BBC, government sources stated that a total of 87 people were killed that day, but it was unclear 
whether the 34 persons mentioned here were included: BBC News, ‘Burundi crisis: army says 87 killed in day 
of violence’, 12 Dec. 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35083823.
54 For example, during our visit in Burundi, Hafsa Mossi was shot by unknown gunmen. See AFP, ‘Former 
Burundi minister Hafsa Mossi shot dead’, MailOnline, 13 July 2013, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/
article-3688204/Former-Burundi-minister-Hafsa-Mossi-shot-dead.html. 
55 On 18 Dec. 2016, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees reported 327,576 refugees from the current situ-
ation. See Refugees Operational Portal, ‘Refugees from Burundi: current situation’, 23 March 2017, https://
data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/burundi. 
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During the events of 2015–2016, the international community made significant 
efforts to prevent the precarious situation from escalating into civil war or even 
genocide. These efforts included that the UNSC adopted three resolutions, three 
presidential statements and conducted two missions to Burundi. In short, the UN 
significantly increased its preventive endeavours in Burundi. Below, we elaborate 
on these UN efforts at preventive diplomacy by looking at three types of power/
knowledge effects. Whereas external actors mostly argue that by intensifying their 
monitoring they simply increase the possibility of knowing the truth about affairs 
in a given country, Foucault’s power/knowledge concept helps us recognize how 
such endeavours (monitoring the situation inside Burundi ever more closely in the 
name of delivering truthful information) are inseparable from important power 
effects. We therefore analyse conflict prevention in Burundi by asking not simply 
whether it succeeded, but what effects it had. First, we discuss how the UN’s 
claim to know the truth about the situation in Burundi was accepted, but also how 
the GoB resisted the UN’s position as sole provider of ‘neutral’ knowledge and 
questioned its role. Second, we analyse how the GoB started arguing in a different 
register in response to what it found to be unwarranted knowledge production 
about Burundi. Third, we show that there are competing narratives about Burundi 
as an object of knowledge, with views ranging from the situation being calm and 
under control to the country being on the brink of a genocide—variations that 
entail very different perspectives on the need, or otherwise, for (further) interven-
tion.
Defining Burundi as in crisis
The renewed emphasis on conflict prevention also entailed a new emphasis on 
information gathering, analysis and reporting by UN agencies. Indeed, the UN 
increased its monitoring presence in Burundi to an extent that the GoB considered 
entirely excessive. Even voices within the UN Secretariat saw a risk of heavy-
handedness: ‘Burundi receives a special envoy every two weeks. The fact that 
there is almost an army of us going to Burundi is too much. All they see is the UN, 
AU [African Union], and EU being against them.’56 Not only did members of the 
UNSC visit Burundi to see the situation for themselves, the Council increasingly 
requested that it should be made party to observations by various other ‘outside’ 
actors (from the AU and other parts of the UN). For example, the Secretary-
General’s Special Adviser, Jamal Benomar, was asked on a number of occasions (e.g. 
in February, April, October and November 2016) to share his observations from 
Burundi.57 In these ways, the UNSC privileged the knowledge being produced 
by various UN and AU actors, thus constituting these external actors as objec-
tive sources of knowledge and truth. Other actors, too, referred to the UN as ‘a 
neutral source of information’, even if they acknowledged the existence of contra-
56 Authors’ interview, New York, 5 Oct. 2016.
57 Benomar was Special Adviser from Nov. 2015: Security Council Report, ‘Burundi’, http://www.security-
councilreport.org/burundi/.
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dictory narratives about the situation in Burundi.58  Furthermore, supported by 
the UN, the AU decided to send and later augment a number of military observers 
and human rights observers. The first round of observers arrived in Bujumbura 
on 22 July 2015. The GoB was allowed only a peripheral role in discussions about 
Burundi in the UN and other international forums, and it was absent in informal 
UNSC meetings, where most of the deliberations took place. NGOs working in 
Burundi were another potential source of information, which was not prioritized 
in the UN system. Reports from human rights NGOs were referred to selec-
tively from time to time, but never in official documents. One western diplomat 
explained his view of a particular report, saying: 
I do not want to judge its quality, but I know that some advocates feel it is a bit off the 
mark. You do not have that with OHCHR [Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights]. Since they are in the Secretariat, I have the feeling they are more cautious 
and neutral.59
In making this comment, the diplomat indicated a hierarchy of knowledge pro -
viders, with the UN at the top, and NGOs and the GoB further down.
The UN dream of objective knowledge 
The starting-point for the UN’s conflict prevention ambitions in respect of Burundi 
is that it is possible, through knowledge-producing activities, to objectively access 
and convey the truth about the situation in the country. In January 2017, António 
Guterres formulated this view as follows: ‘Preventive action is essential to avert 
mass atrocities or grave abuses of human rights. And we can achieve this only 
through reasoned discussion, based on facts and the pursuit of truth.’60 Examples 
of such knowledge-producing activities include monitoring carried out by the 
OHCHR, reporting by the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Conflict 
Prevention, including in Burundi, and field visits made by representatives of the 
UNSC and other high-level envoys. Underwriting all these activities is an assump-
tion that each of these UN bodies will add new details to what will eventually 
amount to an objective assessment of the situation in Burundi. This ‘dreaming of 
a time when knowledge will cease to depend on power’ is part of the explanation 
why the UN cannot see its knowledge production as interventionary, let alone 
take into account its power effects.
The UN’s assumption that it is possible to know the truth about an objective 
reality in Burundi clashes with the existence of radically different accounts of 
events in the country. At least three descriptions of the situation were presented 
by different actors. Broadly speaking, positions differed over whether the situation 
was stable, whether there was a risk of conflict escalation and whether Burundi 
was on the brink of genocide. Tellingly, in July 2016 we interviewed a govern-
58 Authors’ interviews, Bujumbura, 14 July 2016.
59 Authors’ interview, Bujumbura, 13–14 July 2016.
60 Secretary-General’s remarks to the Security Council open debate on ‘Maintenance of international peace and 
security: conflict prevention and sustaining peace’ (as delivered), 10 Jan. 2017. 
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ment official and a UN staff member in their respective offices in Bujumbura. 
The government official pointed out of the window to a quiet street, saying that 
everything was under control and inviting us to visit the interior of the country. 
The UN staff member pointed to a security installation which it had been neces-
sary to set up because of fear of grenade attacks. 
The most controversial narrative was the one focusing on the danger of 
genocide, because it evoked the greatest potential for international action. 
Against the backdrop of a history of civil war and ethnic strife in Burundi, fear 
mounted in the international community that the conflict could acquire an ethnic 
dimension.61 Officially, the UN was careful not to accentuate the ethnic dimen-
sion of the conflict. For example, while the UN Special Adviser on the Preven-
tion of Genocide, Adama Dieng, warned about ethnic violence and the risk of 
atrocity crimes during his visit to Burundi on 29–30 May 2015, he stopped short 
of discussing genocide.62 
Perhaps the strongest criticism of the GoB by a UN source came from the 
UN Independent Investigation on Burundi (UNIIB), which was mandated by 
the Human Rights Council (HRC). Its report stated that ‘experts find that gross 
human rights violations have and are taking place, committed primarily by state 
agents and those linked to them’, and concluded that: 
Without determined interventions by the Government of Burundi and a renewed robust 
engagement by the international community, including the United Nations and the 
African Union, the country’s downward spiral is unlikely to be reversed, endangering not 
only the rights of individuals concerned but also the overall security of the region.63
Resistance from the government of Burundi 
The GoB consistently sought to counter the logic that more monitoring is a 
neutral means of getting closer to the true situation in Burundi. One of the ways 
in which it sought to do this was by discrediting the UN’s attempt to position 
itself a an anchor of objective knowledge about the situation in Burundi. From the 
perspective of the GoB, the knowledge produced by the UN is not objective truth 
but biased criticism. One example of such an attempt at discrediting the UN was 
made in March 2016, when members of the UNSC came on mission to Burundi 
to observe the situation. Disagreements among the P5 meant that no clear state-
ment was issued afterwards.64 The GoB used this dissent in the UNSC to argue 
that there was no crisis in Burundi that would justify continued UN scrutiny, 
61 Following the coup attempt, US officials, for example, warned of ethnic tensions. See Nahal Toosi, ‘US fears 
Burundi on cusp of ethnic violence’, Politico, 18 April 2015. 
62 UN, ‘Statement by Adama Dieng, Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide on 
mission to Burundi’, press release, 30 May 2015, http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/2015-
05-30.SAPG%20statement%20on%20the%20sitations%20in%20Burundi.pdf.
63 Report of the UNIIB established pursuant to HRC Resolution S-24/1, HRC document A/HRC/33/37, 20 
Sept. 2016.
64 Among our interviewees, Russia and China were seen as opposing a strengthened UN engagement in Burundi, 
while France and the US were seen as pushing for a greater international presence.
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portraying the UNSC’s silence as an indication that all was well.65 Thus, the 
visiting mission can be seen as counterproductive to the Council’s preventionist 
ambition. Similarly, an interviewee from the Foreign Ministry in Burundi pointed 
out: ‘African ambassadors see one situation, Europeans see another’, thereby 
highlighting the coexistence of competing accounts of events while simultane-
ously attempting to structure the divide in a specific way, portraying preventionist 
ambitions as a European agenda.
The GoB also used divisions in the UNSC to discredit and challenge the idea 
that the UN held privileged and objective knowledge about the situation, arguing 
for example that the decision to issue Resolution 2303 was illegitimate as it was 
based on ill-founded and biased information about the situation in Burundi. In 
other words, the GoB did not accept that the UN—or indeed any other outside 
actor—should be categorized as neutral or trustworthy. In denying, first, that 
outsiders were neutral, the GoB was not making an epistemological point, but 
rather asserting that the outsiders were politically biased against them. We were 
told that ‘there are numerous signs that the international community is on the 
side of the opposition’.66 One interviewee from the ruling party in Burundi, 
CNDD-FDD, asked why the countries opposing Nkurunziza’s candidature did 
not oppose leaders of other countries in the region who flouted term limits or 
stayed in power, for example in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda 
and Uganda. In an official statement of July 2016, the ruling party attacked the 
opposition for being against democracy and international organizations for 
acting on their behalf.67 In other words, from the perspective of the GoB, the 
international community was discriminatory in its approach to Burundi, which 
resulted in unreasonable overreaction. Second, the GoB maintained that the UN 
and other international actors could not be trusted. The evidence that almost all 
of the government representatives we interviewed would cite revolved around 
two specific stories. The first was that the United States, and consequently the 
UNSC, was biased because the US Ambassador to the UN at the time, Samantha 
Power, was a close friend of Alexis Sinduhije, leader of the Burundian opposition 
party Mouvement pour la Solidarité et le Développement (MSD). They made sure 
we knew that in 2000 Samantha Power co-founded an opposition radio station 
(Radio Publique Africaine) with Sinduhije, including by showing us a summary 
of the founding meeting of the station.68 They did not mention that in late 2015 
the United States instituted targeted sanctions against Sinduhije and three other 
named persons in Burundi for being a threat to peace and security.69 The other 
recurrent story was that French media, Radio France Internationale and France 3 
65 Authors’ interviews, Bujumbura, 13 July 2016.
66 Authors’ interviews, Bujumbura, 13 July 2016.
67 Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD), 
communiqué no. 013/2016, 26 July 2016, http://cndd-fdd.org/2016/08/03/communique-no-0132016-du-parti-
cndd-fdd-du-26-juillet-2016/.
68 Radio Publique Africaine, ‘Procès-verbal de l’assemblée générale de l’association Radio Publique Africaine en 
sigle “R.D.A”’. 7 Jan. 2000. 
69 US Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury sanctions four Burundian individuals’, press release, 18 Dec. 2015, 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0310.aspx.
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in particular, had used images in their coverage of Burundi that were misleading; 
specifically, they had published a picture, saying it was from Burundi, although it 
had actually been taken in Nigeria and at a different time. Both outlets later denied 
the allegation, but our respondents saw it as a deliberate attempt to smear Burundi, 
orchestrated by the French government.70
Perhaps the most important means of resistance used by the GoB was its ability 
to deny international observers access, thereby limiting their ability to monitor. 
The UN was, for example, forbidden to go into the streets of Bujumbura to 
undertake monitoring following the attacks and raids that took place in December 
2015. Amnesty International later reported that it had identified mass graves filled 
with the bodies of those killed during the incidents. In the same vein, the GoB 
responded particularly strongly to the UNIIB report of September 2016: on 11 
October it issued an official statement saying that it had suspended cooperation 
with the the OHCHR, which meant that current OHCHR officers were no 
longer allowed to observe and monitor the situation in Burundi, and that their 
visas would not be renewed. According to the GoB, OHCHR was ‘complicit’ in 
writing the ‘lying and controversial report’. The statement continued by naming 
three experts in UNIIB as persona non grata.71 Around the same time, the GoB 
requested that Benomar no longer cover Burundi for the UN. That letter was 
couched in  diplomatic niceties, but nonetheless amounted to throwing him out of 
the country, which had also been the fate of his predecessors as UN representatives 
during the crisis.72 
Arguing in a different register: effects of power/knowledge on patterns 
of violence 
Together with the GoB’s resistance, the UN’s preventionist knowledge produc-
tion had important effects on the situation in Burundi. Monitoring the situation in 
order to produce supposedly superior knowledge contributed to a shift in (rather 
than simply a lessening of ) violence. Specifically, violence shifted away from the 
visible public forms it had taken at the beginning of the crisis, such as the piles of 
burning tyres seen in media images, the coup d’état, and crackdowns on demon-
strations in the streets of Bujumbura. These were generally replaced with more 
individualized forms such as targeted assassinations and extra-judicial killings, 
allegedly perpetrated by both sides.
The GoB is also said to have responded by changing its tactics to contain the 
opposition through less observable, but no less repressive, means. The more covert 
forms of repression reportedly included moving the violence to secret facilities, 
so that demonstrators were no longer beaten in the streets but removed to hidden 
torture chambers. The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) found 
70 Authors’ interviews, Bujumbura, 14 July 2016.
71 Gouvernement du Burundi, Déclaration du gouvernement burundais sur la collaboration et la coopération avec l’Office 
du Haut Commissariat des Droits de l’Homme au Burundi, 11 Oct. 2016, http://www.burundi.gov.bi/spip.php? 
article1538.
72 Two previous envoys had been forced out during 2015.
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that, in place of the earlier mass arrests, from the beginning of 2016 numbers 
of enforced disappearances increased. ‘This practice aims in particular to conceal 
evidence of abuses by security forces,’ it notes.73 If the FIDH is correct, this devel-
opment fits well with the overall picture of the GoB as being increasingly opposed 
to scrutiny. Unlike the UN, the GoB perceives knowledge production as inter-
ventionary.
The pressure on Burundi also led the government to perceive itself as isolated 
in international forums. It saw less interest in constructive engagement in these 
forums, which it perceived to be used as platforms for international criticism of 
the GoB. A clear consequence with potential fallout for the international legal 
order more broadly was the announcement that Burundi would leave the Inter-
national Criminal Court (ICC), being the first ever country to do so since the 
court’s creation. In this way, the GoB would ‘hide’ itself from outside legal 
scrutiny. Also, according to diplomats covering the Third Committee of the 
UN General Assembly, which deals with human rights issues, Burundi took 
an unusually hard line during the 71st session in autumn 2016, ostensibly in a 
backlash against outside human rights monitoring of individual sovereign states. 
As an example, another diplomat pointed out that Burundi had traditionally 
voted in favour of the General Assembly’s resolutions on human rights in the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), but reversed its position to vote 
against in 2015.74 Underlying the switch, according to the same diplomat, was 
the thought that Burundi might be the next object of a critical resolution in the 
Third Committee.75 In other words, this is an example of Burundi working to 
delegitimize outside knowledge production about the ‘internal’ affairs of states, 
and attempting to decrease international visibility and the productive effects of 
power/knowledge.
By early 2017, the obstruction of outside monitoring activities could be said to 
have had some success. Diplomats in New York told us that they were preoccupied 
with other situations in the region. Since little was happening in Burundi, or at 
least little they knew of, there was not much they could do. After the adoption of 
Resolution 2303 on 29 July 2016, the UNSC only had Burundi on its agenda twice 
during the rest of the year—a considerable slowdown for the period—and mostly 
to be briefed by Benomar on the (lack of ) implementation of the  resolution.
From ‘truth’ to intervention (or not)
Since the UN, through its preventive endeavours, had become the key source of 
information about Burundi, it mattered a great deal what knowledge was circu-
lating in the UN system. The accepted knowledge about the situation has a strong 
73 FIDH, Repression and genocidal dynamics in Burundi, Nov. 2016, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/burundi_
report_english-2.pdf.
74 Authors’ interviews, New York, 4 Oct. 2016. For voting records on the resolutions, see A/C.3/70/L.35, http://
www.un.org/en/ga/third/70/docs/voting_sheets/L.35.pdf (for 2015) and A/C.3/69/L.28/Rev.1*, http://
www.un.org/en/ga/third/69/docs/voting_sheets/L.28.Rev.1.pdf (for 2014).
75 Authors’ interview, New York, 4 Oct. 2016.
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influence on the perceived need for further intervention, and thus shapes the 
policy options that international actors see as relevant. For example, in Resolu-
tion 2303 the UNSC reiterated its ‘deep concern about the persistence of violence 
in Burundi’ and—despite an explicit lack of consent from the GoB—authorized 
the deployment of 228 police officers.76 As of October 2017, the lack of consent 
had made it impossible to implement the resolution.77 In taking its decision, the 
Council relied significantly on information from UN agencies’ monitoring activi-
ties and briefings by UN officials. As such, the choice to report on Burundi as a 
country in crisis, possibly even at risk of genocide, enabled centrally placed actors 
to explore the possibilities for intervention in the more traditional sense of the 
word, that is, with foreign troops on the ground. Such intervention had almost 
materialized at an earlier moment, when in December 2015 the AU Peace and 
Security Commission decided to deploy an African Prevention and Protection 
Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU), consisting of 5,000 peacekeepers, whose first 
mandated task included further knowledge production in the form of monitoring: 
‘MAPROBU is mandated to: (a) prevent any deterioration of the security situa-
tion, monitor its evolution and report developments on the ground.’78 In the end, 
deployment was cancelled at a subsequent AU summit.
This account offers an illustration of how the knowledge production carried 
out in the name of conflict prevention can have important impacts on the framing 
of intervention possibilities. Crucially, the privileging of observations made by 
various UN bodies about detailed developments ‘inside’ Burundi made it possible, 
in the name of prevention, to render Burundi open to new forms of intervention 
by external, knowledge-producing actors. This in turn enabled other external 
actors (notably the AU, East African Community and EU) to enter the picture as 
producers of valid knowledge about the situation in Burundi—a situation whose 
‘truth’ was thus increasingly produced by external actors. The power to define 
Burundi was taken away from the GoB and vested in outside entities.
Case findings 
The definition of Burundi as in crisis, the change in patterns of violence, and the 
framing of Burundi as ‘intervenable’ are three examples of effects of UN know -
ledge production activities—activities that are integral to contemporary forms 
of conflict prevention. For now, the international community, and the UN in 
 particular, does not recognize that its knowledge production ‘induces effects of 
power’.79 When international actors attempt to move the goalposts of sovereignty, 
as they have done with preventive diplomacy in Burundi, it is regarded as a progres-
76 UNSC Resolution 2303, 29 July 2016, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/ 2303(2016). 
77 The UNSC expressed deep concern about the lack of implementation in its Presidential Statement of 2 
August 2017, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PRST/2017/13.
78 Peace and Security Council of the AU, ‘Communiqué of the 565th meeting of the PSC on the situation in 
Burundi’, 17 Dec. 2015, http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-565th-meeting-of-the-psc-
on-the-situation-in-burundi. 
79 Foucault, Power/knowledge, p. 51. 
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sive move ‘from early warning to early action’;80 but, seen from the perspective of 
the GoB, the risk is that it becomes ‘early aggression’.81 Thus, conflict prevention is 
not an alternative to intervention, but itself an interventionary practice. We have 
shown the importance of taking note of the new and sometimes subtler forms that 
interventionary practices are taking—and of the potential for even subtle forms 
of intervention to have important constitutive effects. More specifically, we argue 
that to appreciate the scope and effects of contemporary practices of intervention, 
knowledge production for the purpose of early warning and preventive diplo-
macy should be included among these practices. We thus challenge the idea that 
by aiming to prevent violent conflict, intervention can be avoided. 
Conclusion: conflict prevention as a pragmatic response to a twofold 
crisis—in Burundi and of liberal interventionism
Some observers have deemed UN endeavours at conflict prevention in Burundi 
an outright failure. This assessment is based partly on how the GoB has responded 
to the UN’s initiatives, and partly on the continuance—and shifting patterns—of 
violence in Burundi. Others argue that conflict prevention has been successful, 
in that the situation would have deteriorated further had the UN not been 
monitoring the situation. They argue that UN engagement ‘led to relatively 
peaceful elections’ and that ‘things could have been much worse otherwise’.82 
Whether conflict prevention was a failure or success is likely to continue to be 
disputed. However, irrespective of how that question is answered, the insight 
remains that the UN’s knowledge production for purposes of preventive diplo-
macy had important constitutive effects on the situation. 
In the context of a changing interventionist landscape, the case of Burundi 
illustrates a mode of engagement that avoids traditional large-scale interventions, 
but ends up being highly interventionist nonetheless. Thus this analysis of conflict 
prevention as intervention is linked to broader debates about the expansion or 
retreat of liberal interventionism. Contributing to these debates, our analysis 
suggests that although preventive intervention falls short of large-scale interven-
tionism and might be assumed to overcome some of the associated challenges, 
paying attention to the power/knowledge effects of preventive modes of engage-
ment allows us to better appreciate the important effects of current forms of preven-
tive intervention, and their capacity to produce some of the same challenges. By 
portraying conflict prevention as an alternative to intervention, most discussions 
short-circuit considerations about the pros and cons of intervention. As such, the 
aspiration to prevent conflict risks blinding the international community to the 
unintended consequences that follow from such interventions. Obviously, we 
agree that conflict prevention is preferable to conflict. What we wish to highlight 
80 International Crisis Group, Seizing the moment: from early warning to early action, Special Report no. 2/Global, 
22 June 2016, https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/seizing-moment-early-warning-early-action. 
81 The phrase ‘early aggression’ came up in the authors’ interview with a Burundian official, Bujumbura, 14 July 
2016.
82 Authors’ interview, Bujumbura, 15 July 2016.
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is the point that seeing prevention as intervention will allow important lessons to 
be learned and usefully applied, including the risk of unintended consequences. 
The implementation of preventive diplomacy is part of a pragmatic turn in the 
sense that it is indicative of a shift away from a ‘blueprint’ or ‘template’ approach 
to conflict prevention, in line with the HIPPO Report’s assessment that ‘too 
often, mandates and missions are produced on the basis of templates instead of 
tailored to support situation-specific political strategies’.83 That said, preventive 
diplomacy, and the monitoring activities it necessitates, risks becoming a new 
template if applied uncritically to all situations. There are many good reasons 
for making prevention the preferred solution, including reasons laid out in the 
HIPPO and PBC reports; but the recommendation that responses be tailored to 
each individual situation certainly also remains valid.
As the concept of sustaining peace is still new to the UN system and the crisis 
in Burundi remains unresolved, it is too early to evaluate the implications for 
broader policy developments. If, however, knowledge production for preven-
tive diplomacy comes to be seen as a best practice, it is likely to be replicated 
by the international community in other settings. In this way it could become a 
mechanism for the expansion of interventionary practices. It is possible to argue 
that this form of intervention is already projecting power in more countries than 
were previously considered accessible to outside interference. For example, since 
2014 the UNSC has held annual debates about the human rights situation in the 
DPRK, notwithstanding strong opposition from some member states, including 
the Russian Federation and China. This means that, disregarding whether the 
government in Pyongyang consents to the definition, the UNSC defines the situa-
tion in the DPRK as a threat to international peace and security—a claim explic-
itly based on monitoring and reporting conducted by UN officials.84 As such, the 
approach is very similar to that pursued in the case of Burundi.
To summarize, conflict prevention in the form of monitoring and reporting 
from a supposedly superior position of knowledge production is inseparable 
from important power effects; and by appreciating this, it becomes possible to see 
conflict prevention as a pragmatic interventionary practice in response to a dual 
crisis. The UN is testing new ways of preventing the escalation of a particular crisis 
in Burundi. This, however, is also part of a broader response to ongoing debates 
about a ‘crisis’ of liberal interventionism—a response that is not simply a retreat 
but rather a testing of new modes of engagement. There may well be a shift away 
from large-scale interventions; but conflict prevention is increasingly regarded as 
an alternative, that is, as another way of (rather than a retreat from) intervening, 
with a lighter footprint. From this perspective, the framing of conflict prevention 
as an interventionary practice leads us to conclude that liberal interventionism is 
still active. On the surface, there is a retreat from liberal interventionism because 
of a lack of political will to make large-scale forceful interventions; but we are 
also seeing an expansion through increased efforts aimed at monitoring strangers.
83 HIPPO Report, p. vii.
84 UNSC, 7830th meeting, 9 Dec. 2016, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7830. 
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